Classify ClickHouse NO_COMMON_TYPE (386) as unsafe (#1380)

## Summary
- Add ClickHouse error code `386` (`NO_COMMON_TYPE`) to
`UNSAFE_CLICKHOUSE_ERROR_CODES` in
`apps/backend/src/lib/clickhouse-errors.ts`. This stops the Sentry
`StackAssertionError` (`Unknown Clickhouse error: code 386 not in safe
or unsafe codes`) that was firing whenever an admin wrote a query like
`SELECT [1, 'a']` or `SELECT if(1, 'a', 1)`, while keeping the raw error
message out of prod responses.
- Add two e2e regression tests: one against the cross-project
`analytics_internal.users` table, and one against `system.query_log`, to
pin that 386 is wrapped with the generic `Error during execution of this
query.` message in prod (full detail only surfaces in dev/test).

## Why unsafe, not safe
Both callers of `getSafeClickhouseErrorMessage`
(`apps/backend/src/app/api/latest/internal/analytics/query/route.ts:59`
and `apps/backend/src/lib/ai/tools/sql-query.ts:80`) execute
caller-authored SQL under `readonly: "1"` with
`SQL_project_id`/`SQL_branch_id` scoping. The ClickHouse client runs
under a `limited_user` whose grants restrict most tables — but
ClickHouse resolves types **before** enforcing ACL. That means a query
like `SELECT if(1, query, 1) FROM system.query_log` surfaces code 386
with a message like `There is no supertype for types String, UInt8 ...`,
leaking that `system.query_log.query` is a `String` — schema info from a
table the caller can't actually read.

This is the same type-before-ACL class as code 43
(`ILLEGAL_TYPE_OF_ARGUMENT`), which is already classified unsafe.
Classifying 386 as unsafe keeps the defense-in-depth consistent: if
per-customer tables are ever introduced and grants don't block
reference-resolution in time, 386 won't leak their schema.

Cost: in prod, an admin writing a malformed type-mismatch query sees
only `Error during execution of this query.` instead of the supertype
hint. Dev and test environments still show the full error via the
existing `getNodeEnvironment()` branch, so local iteration is
unaffected.

## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm test run
apps/e2e/tests/backend/endpoints/api/v1/analytics-query.test.ts` — all
64 tests pass, including the two 386 regression tests.
- [ ] Monitor Sentry after deploy to confirm the
`unknown-clickhouse-error-for-query` events for code 386 stop firing.

<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->

## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved handling of a ClickHouse type-mismatch error to prevent
exposure of sensitive data and ensure sanitized error responses.

* **Tests**
* Added regression tests that verify error responses are sanitized,
return consistent error codes, and include expected headers without
leaking internal details.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const UNSAFE_CLICKHOUSE_ERROR_CODES = [
43, // ILLEGAL_TYPE_OF_ARGUMENT
47, // UNKNOWN_IDENTIFIER
60, // UNKNOWN_TABLE
386, // NO_COMMON_TYPE
497, // ACCESS_DENIED
];

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@ -232,6 +232,41 @@ it("handles invalid SQL query", async ({ expect }) => {
`);
});
it("does not leak data from the internal cross-project users table via type-mismatch errors", async ({ expect }) => {
const response = await runQuery({
query: "SELECT if(1, primary_email, 1) AS leaked FROM analytics_internal.users LIMIT 1",
});
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const errorText = JSON.stringify(response.body);
expect(errorText).not.toContain("@");
expect(errorText).not.toMatch(/primary_email\s*[:=]\s*['"]/);
expect(stripQueryId(response, expect)).toMatchInlineSnapshot(`
NiceResponse {
"status": 400,
"body": {
"code": "ANALYTICS_QUERY_ERROR",
"details": {
"error": deindent\`
Error during execution of this query.
As you are in development mode, you can see the full error: 386 There is no supertype for types String, UInt8 because some of them are String\\\\/FixedString\\\\/Enum and some of them are not: In scope SELECT if(1, primary_email, 1) AS leaked FROM analytics_internal.users LIMIT 1.
\`,
},
"error": deindent\`
Error during execution of this query.
As you are in development mode, you can see the full error: 386 There is no supertype for types String, UInt8 because some of them are String\\\\/FixedString\\\\/Enum and some of them are not: In scope SELECT if(1, primary_email, 1) AS leaked FROM analytics_internal.users LIMIT 1.
\`,
},
"headers": Headers {
"x-stack-known-error": "ANALYTICS_QUERY_ERROR",
<some fields may have been hidden>,
},
}
`);
});
it("can execute query returning multiple rows", async ({ expect }) => {
const response = await runQuery({ query: "SELECT arrayJoin([0, 1, 2]) AS number" });
@ -1658,6 +1693,40 @@ it("does not leak column names from restricted tables via illegal type of argume
`);
});
it("does not leak data from restricted tables via type-mismatch errors (code 386)", async ({ expect }) => {
// ClickHouse resolves types before checking permissions, so a code 386
// referencing a restricted table column would otherwise leak its type.
// 386 is classified unsafe so the raw message must not reach prod.
const response = await runQuery({
query: "SELECT if(1, query, 1) FROM system.query_log",
});
expect(stripQueryId(response, expect)).toMatchInlineSnapshot(`
NiceResponse {
"status": 400,
"body": {
"code": "ANALYTICS_QUERY_ERROR",
"details": {
"error": deindent\`
Error during execution of this query.
As you are in development mode, you can see the full error: 386 There is no supertype for types String, UInt8 because some of them are String\\\\/FixedString\\\\/Enum and some of them are not: In scope SELECT if(1, query, 1) FROM system.query_log.
\`,
},
"error": deindent\`
Error during execution of this query.
As you are in development mode, you can see the full error: 386 There is no supertype for types String, UInt8 because some of them are String\\\\/FixedString\\\\/Enum and some of them are not: In scope SELECT if(1, query, 1) FROM system.query_log.
\`,
},
"headers": Headers {
"x-stack-known-error": "ANALYTICS_QUERY_ERROR",
<some fields may have been hidden>,
},
}
`);
});
it("does not leak column names from restricted tables via unknown identifier (code 47)", async ({ expect }) => {
// ClickHouse resolves identifiers before checking permissions, and suggests
// real column names ("Maybe you meant: ..."), so code 47 must be unsafe